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JURISDICTION:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
Did the Third District Court ("trial court") err in ordering that appellant's attempt to adopt
the visitation schedule contained in UCA § 30-3-35 is a modification of a divorce decree when
appellant's divorce decree provides that appellant is awarded reasonable visitation?

The

supporting authority for this issue is UCA § 30-3-32, 30-3-33, 30-3-34, and 30-3-35.

STATUTES:
The following are relevant portions of the Utah statutes which apply in this case, and the
Utah Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the remaining portions of the statutes which
are attached as an addendum hereto:
UCA § 30-3-32:
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level consistent with all parties'
interests.
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential
harm to the child:
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents
to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation
or divorce;
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best
interests; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in
parenting the child.
UCA § 30-3-33:
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory guidelines are
suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between parents. These advisory guidelines
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include:
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a courtimposed solution;
(2) the visitation schedule shall utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the
child's life;
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater frequency or other
arrangements consistent with the child's best interests for children under age 5; otherwise
the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall apply;

UCA § 30-3-34:
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may establish a visitation
schedule consistent with the best interest of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visitation schedule as
provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The
visitation schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent
and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the
evidence.
UCA § 30-3-35:
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with
kindergarten.
(2) If the parents do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be
considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be
entitled:
STATEMENT OF CASE:
The nature of the case involves visitation of the parties' three minor children and the
motion of the appellant seeking visitation with the children consistent with UCA § 30-3-35.
Appellant sought, through an Order to Show Cause, visitation of the children, and a hearing was
held on December 14, 1993, before Domestic Relations Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.
Subsequent to his recommendation, the appellant filed and objection and sought a hearing from
Judge Timothy R. Hanson. Judge Hanson denied the hearing request and issued a memorandum
decision and order (see attached exhibit "A"). Judge Hanson ruled that appellant had improperly
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sought to modify his decree of divorce by order to show cause which was inconsistent with Rule
6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:
The appellant has properly sought visitation pursuant to UCA § 30-3-35 as the decree of
divorce states that the appellant is entitled to reasonable visitation. It was and is the intention
of the Utah Legislature to provide a visitation schedule which is: i) in the best interest of the
children, and ii) is at a minimum reasonable. Thus, the appellant holds that i) since there is a
reasonable visitation schedule established by statute, ii) the appellant's decree of divorce states
that he is entitled to reasonable visitation, and iii) the appellant and appellee could not agree to
a visitation schedule, and iv) visitation should be in the best interest of the children, that both the
appellant and the children are entitled to the visitation schedule as outlined in Section 30-3-35
without first obtaining a modification of decree of divorce, as appellant is not modifying the
decree of divorce. Appellant holds that he did not attempt to modify his decree of divorce, rather
he sought reasonable visitation which has been outlined by statute.
ARGUMENT:
Pursuant to the decree of divorce in this matter, the appellant was awarded reasonable
visitation with the parties three minor children. As were many cases historically, the courts in
Utah have used the word reasonable with respect to visitation in divorce decrees. In many
divorce decrees, as in this case, there was no schedule set forth in the decree itself, just the word
reasonable in conjunction with the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. In other words, the
parties or the courts were left to decide what is reasonable. Unfortunately, many parties could
not agree to the reasonableness of visitation and thus sought court assistance. After many years
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of parents clogging the courts with visitation disputes and in the best interest of the children of
divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents, the Utah Legislature passed into law effective May
3, 1993, a minimum visitation schedule1. The appellant has sought visitation pursuant to the
minimum visitation schedule and was denied, as the trial court interpreted the attempt to adopt
the minimum visitation schedule as a modification of the decree of divorce. This, however, is
not the case. Despite any lack of consistency with the statute, had the parties' decree of divorce
outlined specific days and time for visitation, the trial court's argument would be consistent
because the minimum visitation schedule may if fact change certain agreed upon dates and times
for visitation. However, the decree of divorce in this matter simply states that the appellant is
awarded reasonable visitation. It is understood that the minimum visitation schedule is, at a
minimum, in the best interest of the children and is reasonable. In fact Section 30-3-33 (7)
states:
"the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the visitation
allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized
visitation provided in Section 30-3-35. UCA § 30-3-33 (7) emphasis added.

Although there is reference to divorced parents in Section 30-3-32 (2)(a), it would appear
that the definition is somewhat inconsistent. At 30-3-32 (3)(a), for purposes of Sections 30-3-32
through 30-3-37: "'Child' means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated
parents." Yet at Section 30-3-32 (2)(a), it is in the best interest of the child of ... divorced ...
parents... This implies that the child of divorced parents also should fall under the definition
contained in 30-3-32 (3)(a). Appellant holds that this is an oversight on the legislature's part and
should be corrected. In addition to this error, Section 30-3-32 (2)(a) leaves out that it is in the
best interest of the child of separating parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing
access, yet the section ends with the statement "following separation." This too is probably an
oversight on the legislature's part. Since these inconsistencies exist, it is assumed that the
definition of Child shall include the child or children of divorced parents, as implied at Section
30-3-32.
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Thus, it is implicit that the minimum visitation schedule is in fact reasonable. For the trial court
to hold that the best interest of the children are best served by a schedule which is less than that
provided for in Section 30-3-35 is to assume that the minimum visitation schedule is
unreasonable.

Further, the trial court held that by using the minimum visitation schedule

contained in Section 30-3-35, it was a modification of the decree of divorce. However, the
decree of divorce awards the appellant reasonable visitation and as the minimum visitation
schedule is reasonable, the appellant is in fact not modifying the divorce decree. A modification
implies changes to the original decree; however, the retroactive adoption of the minimum
visitation schedule is not a modification in as much as the decree specifically awards the
appellant reasonable visitation.
The appellate court may be concerned about the custodial parent rights as well.
Fortunately, the Utah legislature has provided for the rights of the custodial parent in the
rebuttable presumption contained in UCA § 30-3-34.
CONCLUSION:
Appellant respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's order.
Appellant properly sought visitation pursuant to UCA § 30-3-35 through an order to show cause,
as Section 30-3-35 should be considered reasonable and retroactively adopted when no schedule
is ordered in the original decree of divorce but the noncustodial parent is awarded reasonable
visitation.
DATED THIS 28th DAY OF June, 1994.

ICHARB T. WYGANT
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Richard T. Wygant, served two (2) copies of the foregoing Appellant Brief upon Roger
K. Tschanz, Esq., attorney for the appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Roger K. Tschanz, Esq.
Attorney for Appellee
2400 West 7800 South, Suite 209
West Jordan, Utah 84084
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places

pursuant

to

recently

enacted

MEMORANDUM DECISION

legislation

dealing

with

visitation rights of non-custodial parents.
While it certainly may be appropriate, particularly in view of
the

history

of

this

case,

that

visitation

be

precisely

and

accurately determined so that the parties will understand their
respective
modified

obligations, an existing divorce Decree may not be

by means of an Order to Show Cause procedure as the

defendant has attempted to do here. Compounding the problem is the
defendant's apparent failure to seek a formal Petition to Modify
where a full, appropriate hearing can be had, even in the face of
visitation difficulties that the parties have experienced over the
years.
Accordingly, the Commissioner's recommendation that visitation
may

not

be modified

on the basis of an Order

to

Show

Cause

proceeding, all as particularly specified in Rule 6-404 of the Code
of Judicial Administration, is appropriate. This Court declines to
grant an expedited hearing on a matter where the Commissioner is
clearly not in error, and where the immediacy of the situation is
because of the defendant's failure over the years to file a formal
Petition to Modify so that the matter can be heard in a fashion
that would give both sides an opportunity to present their
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respective positions as to what formalized visitation dates and
times ought to be imposed.
The Court assumes that the defendant does not object to the
Commissioner's recommendation that the defendant should be granted
one-half of the children's Christmas visitation, and a portion of
the day on Christmas Day.
The Commissioner's recommendation is contained in the file on
that issue, however, it has not been reduced to a formal Order, nor
has the time period for the plaintiff to object expired as of the
date of the dictation of this Memorandum Decision and Order.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court declines to consider the
defendant's request for expedited disposition of his Objection to
the Commissioner's recommendation of December 13, 1993.
Further, this Court affirms the Commissioner's observation and
recommendation that the visitation originally provided for in the
Decree of Divorce may not be modified through an Order to Show
Cause procedure, all as clearly set forth in Rule 6-404(1) of the
Code of Judicial Administration.
No formal Order will be necessary in connection with the
defendant's

request

for

expedited

hearing

or

this

Court's

affirmation of the Commissioner's refusal to consider modification
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based upon the Order to Show Cause process inasmuch as this Order
will stand as the Court's orders on those issues.
Dated this / y^dav of December, 1993.

/^L

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this,
December, 1993:

Doreen Wygant
Pro se
4521 South 5780 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84118

Richard T. Wygant
Pro se
82 0 W. Fremont Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

.day of

30-3-32. Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definition.
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level consistent with all parties' interests.
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child:
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or
adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access
to each parent following separation or divorce;
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and
responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child
consistent with the child's best interests; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively
involved in parenting the child.
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or
adjudicated parents.
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on
the evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break
until the evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas
Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day.
(c) "Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a
weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and
"Christmas school vacation."
History: C. 1953, 30-3-32, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-33. Advisory guidelines.
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between parents. These advisory guidelines include:
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution;
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity
and stability of the child's life;
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in
Section 30-3-35 shall apply;
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the
child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings,
family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which
may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule;
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular
school hours shall not be interrupted;
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the
time he is returned;
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase
the visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish
the standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35;
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of
exercising visitation;
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule;
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully;
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a
medical emergency;
(12) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and
telephone number within 24 hours of any change;
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact
during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child;
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in

allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child
care;
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address,
and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for
good cause orders otherwise; and
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious
holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right
to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-33, enacted by L.
1993, eh. 131, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-34,

Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.

(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may
establish a visitation schedule consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the
best interests of the child. The visitation schedule shall be considered the
minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be
entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the
evidence. The presumption may be rebutted based upon a finding of the court
including any of the following criteria:
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical health;
(b) visitation would significantly impair the child's emotional development;
(c) a substantiated allegation of child abuse exists;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child during periods of visitation;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of
sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure
youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility; and
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.
(3) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the parties may not
alter the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-34, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch 131 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25

(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18,
beginning with kindergarten.
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial
parent and the child shall be entitled:
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m;
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the
entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year;
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend
visitation schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for
that school day;
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free
from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent
shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until
11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day
until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holidav

(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until
11 p.m. on the holiday;
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A.
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until
Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m.
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(ij Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial
parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial
parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school
for purposes of vacation;
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be lh of the vacation time for year-round
school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

